

15 June 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Security Aspects to NPIC Participation in COINS

1. NPIC is a designated participant in the planning of the Community On-Line Intelligence System (COINS). Until earlier in 1970 NPIC served as a subscribing subsystem to this network; however, a determination that the file which NPIC had made available for network query required special TKH controls necessitated the withdrawal of NPIC from active COINS participation.
2. On 7 May 1970, by memorandum, the COINS Project Manager requested that appropriate steps be taken to have NPIC remain in network operations in a passive mode. A passive mode participation would permit NPIC users to query other subsystem files, but would not include the querying of NPIC files from the other subsystems of the network.
3. By mutual agreement all portions of the COINS network are secured in accordance with the requirements set forth for the protection of Top Secret [redacted] material. COINS users in all subsystems hold a minimum of a Top Secret clearance and are access approved for SI material. A significant portion of the network is not secured to the TKH level, and many COINS users are not access approved for TKH material.
4. Information resident in, and/or being processed by, the NPIC computers includes TKH material. State-of-the-art limitation can not guaranty against spillage of such TKH material to a line tying an NPIC computer to the COINS network. It is not operationally feasible at this time to raise the level of the COINS network to the TKH level.

~~SECRET~~

5X1
6X1

25X

5. The problem is then posed whether adequate security safeguards can be implemented to permit NPIC once again to participate on a full-time basis (e.g., during normal duty hours) in COINS operations. As a result of the 7 May 1970 COINS Project Manager's request and specifically in response to a request from Mr. [REDACTED] WDC/Promising Staff, the undersigned met with NPIC personnel on 3 and 10 June 1970 to discuss the above problem with a view toward determining a feasible resolution. Mr. [REDACTED] of this office took part in the discussions and Mr. [REDACTED] provided the NPIC input.

6. The NPIC personnel outlined their desire to rejoin the COINS network in a passive role, in which NPIC analysts could query the files of other subsystem members, but NPIC itself would provide no files for network query. It was proposed that the COINS network be treated as a "terminal" of the NPIC system and that a Model 558 printer be attached to the output line to COINS for the purpose of recording all data being transmitted out on this line. The monitored output would thus be subject to periodic review to ensure that no TKH material was being sent over this line, in fact, to ensure that no material was being output except legitimate queries to the network. In addition to serving as a guard on unauthorized output, NPIC believes that such a monitor over a period of time would gather valuable statistics for later use in evaluating system security.

7. The risks of spillage to the COINS network were defined during the 3 June discussion:

- a. TKH material;
- b. Other restricted compartmented series, e.g., [REDACTED]
Restricted Data;
- c. Proprietary CIA/NPIC information.

8. NPIC currently has two computers, both UNIVAC Model 494 systems, which operate independently and separately. The NPIC personnel indicated that the independence of these two systems could be

25X

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

effort to advantage in segregating proprietary CIA material, [] information, and Restricted Data in an absolute fashion from possible COINS spillage. This segregation would be accomplished in the following manner.

25X

9. By arbitrarily identifying the NPIC computers as 494A and 494B, the former represents the system handling the Integrated Information System (IIS); the latter the real-time mensuration processor. While both systems would process SI/TKH material, all [] processing and any Restricted Data would be exclusively handled by the 494B. The 494A would be tied into the COINS network with the 558 TTY printer recording the output on the COINS line. The NPIC Management Information System might be handled by either computer but only at times when the 494A is not tied into COINS.

25X

10. It is important to note the juxtaposition of the proposed monitoring device and to emphasize that its operation is hardware based. It would be hard wired as a monitor on the line between the Central Processing Unit (CPU) and the KG-13 or other cryptographic unit; it would thus record material as it leaves the NPIC area of control immediately prior to encryption.


11. Tying the NPIC computer into COINS makes the NPIC system a multi-security level one. While this system does not at present have all of the security features foreseen as minimum requirements for the multi-level operation of computer systems, as these standards are now being developed for USIB promulgation, in the opinion of the undersigned, adequate means of control will exist under the terms outlined above. While this does not represent a long-term solution, the undersigned would look favorably on its conditions to resolve the instant problem of NPIC's rejoining COINS in passive mode. On the other hand, NPIC has made it clear that it will implement minimum requirements for multi-level operation as soon as these standards are promulgated.

12. During the 10 June 1970 meeting, the undersigned expressed his satisfaction with the proposed resolution of the problem. He emphasized, however, that in view of the fact that the protection of TKH material was involved, the approval of the TSO/CIA was needed in order to permit NPIC to rejoin the COINS operation even under the conditions outlined.

SECRET

13. The CSC/CIA has been requested to approve the proposal. NPIC will be informed of his decision.

14. At the 10 June 1970 meeting the undersigned raised the possibility that the 558 TTY printer for hardware or other reasons may prove inoperative in its proposed use as a monitor. NPIC personnel recognize this possibility and acknowledged that in such an event we would have to seek another alternative in resolving the problem.



Chief, Information Processing Branch
Executive and Planning Division

cc SDI Planning Staff

CIA COMINT Subsystem Manager

5X1

142

CENTER RATING SLIP

Approved For Release 2004/02/11 : CIA-RDP78B05703A000300030006-4

Deputy Chief, Automated Information Div. 22 June 1970

TO	INITIALS	DATE	REMARKS
DIRECTOR			RECENT DEVELOP -
DEP/DIRECTOR			MENTS ON COINS .
EXEC/DIRECTOR	3. off 6/25		
SPECIAL ASST			
ASST TO DIR	2. TAC 6/25		
HISTORIAN			FYI
CH/PPBS			(Copy sent to EHK 6/26/70)
DEP CH/PPBS			
EO/PPBS			
CH/IEG			
DEP CH/IEG			
EO/IEG			
CH/PSG	1 5-25 Jun 70		
DEP CH/PSG			
EO/PSG			
CH/TSSG			
DEP CH/TSSG			
EO/TSSG			
CH/SSD/TSSG			
PERSONNEL			
LOGISTICS			
TRAINING			
RECORDS MGT			
SECURITY			
FINANCE			
DIR/IAS/DDI			
CH/DIAXX-4			
CH/DIAAP-9			
CH/SPAD			

Approved For Release 2004/02/11 : CIA-RDP78B05703A000300030006-4

IP FM 30 (12-69) - OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS